logo.jpg (6662 bytes)

Media

ICD findings on escape from holding cells at Cape High Court

Latest Media releases
~ ~ ~ ~
Nqakula tables ICD report on Domestic Violence Act
~ ~ ~ ~
ICD Western Cape head found not guilty of misconduct
~ ~ ~ ~
Policeman convicted on murder charge
~ ~ ~ ~


MEDIA STATEMENT

11 October 2002

MEDIA BRIEFING

On 19 September 2002 three (3) awaiting trial prisoners facing charges relating to urban terror escaped from a holding cell at the Cape High Court.

The prisoners were attending Court in the normal course of their respective court proceedings. After having appeared in Court the prisoners consulted their legal representatives and at approximately 12:30 were placed together in a holding cell. It is alleged that apart from a chain placed on Jenneker's legs, they were not handcuffed, neither were their legs placed in restraints.

It is alleged that on 19 September 2002 at approximately 13:23 the three prisoners escaped from the holding cells of the Cape High Court. The court cells are situated in the basement of the building.

Our investigation focussed on essentially three areas:

i) Misconduct or negligence on the part of any SAPS members entrusted with the safekeeping of the escapees;
ii) Adequacy of security measures at the Cape High Court;
iii) Implementation of previous ICD recommendations, made after the escape on 4 October 2001.

FINDINGS

MISCONDUCT/NEGLIGENCE OF SAPS MEMBERS

1. There were no shortages of SAPS members on duty. Eighteen (18) persons were assigned for duty. Sixteen (16) reported for duty.

2. Of the sixteen (16) SAPS members on duty, only 8 were in fact in the building during the lunch hour. Some members left for lunch whilst others attended a training course. There was no member stationed outside the holding cell at the time of the escape.

3. Searches of the escapees were not carried out as diligently as they should have been or at all, after they were escorted from consultations with their legal representatives. Proper searches were also not conducted on all visitors, including legal representatives. According to one of the police members, it was not necessary to conduct these searches.

4. The same SAPS members who were in attendance at the previous escape were assigned to do duty on 4 October 2001. The same Inspector, against whom disciplinary action was taken, upon ICD recommendation, for his negligence during the escape of 4 October 2001, was on this occasion placed in charge of the eighteen (18) SAPS members and was in fact responsible for the keys.

5. Several members of the SAPS derelicted in their duties.

6. On 9 July 2002, the Provincial Inspectorate of the SAPS inspected the security at the Court and reported that all measures were adequate.

7. Since 19 September 2002, the SAPS have posted a guard in the passage outside the cells. The guard will be able to attend to any prisoner in the cells. This practice is commended.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS ICD RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations made previously were not implemented in the following respects:

* Staffing was not addressed. The same members who were on duty during the first escape were also on duty on 19 September 2002;
* The insufficient and inadequate use of leg irons;
* Appropriate positioning / stationing of guards outside the cells of high profile persons;
* Key security;
* The sanction imposed on the member found guilty of negligence and dereliction of duty during the escape of 4 October 2001 was neither of consequence nor a deterrent;
* Outsourcing of the security function at courts;
* The proper management of security staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

* A police officer be transferred from the Court based on the fact that he failed his polygraph test.

* Four police officers be prosecuted departmentally under R18 (1), R18 (21), R18 (22).

* The grill door in the passage just before cells 7,8 and 9 be locked or a new grill door installed at this point. Further all locks and keys to all the cells and doors within the cell area must be changed. Once the locks have been replaced, their numbers must be concealed.

* A security camera is installed in the passage leading from cells 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 and the passage of cells 7,8 and 9, as well as in the passage where court orderlies lead prisoners from the cells to Courts 5,14 and 15.

* SAPS members working as court orderlies should be rotated on an annual or six monthly basis to prevent boredom and frustration, which in turn leads to non-compliance with Standing Orders and a negligent attitude.

* It must be emphasised with SAPS members that they will be charged with dereliction of duty when procedures relating to cell/ other keys are not complied with.

CONCLUSION

In our opinion, we would at this stage strongly advise, as an interim measure, that police officers responsible for the security of urban terror trialists and other high profile suspects on trial at Western Cape Courts, not be based in the Western Cape, but that police officers from outside the Province perform these duties. In addition, that person such as the urban terror trialists, attending trial at Courts in the Western Cape, also be guarded by the SAPS Task Force. This measure was successfully implemented at the sentencing of Colin Chauke, also a high profile escapee, recently. As a long-term measure, we are of the opinion that the security and safekeeping at courts of awaiting trial prisoners should be outsourced, and removed from the competency of the SAPS.

We are currently conducting a criminal investigation against two SAPS members.


Issued by Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD)

Steve Mabona
ICD National Spokesperson
082 809 1927

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~